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STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW DEFINITIONS OF
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS
W. LEwis RODERTS*
(1) Under the Common Law.
The common law permits an owner of an estate in land to
create lesser estates therein and to convey them to different per-
sons so that there may be several estates owned by different
persons in the same land at the same time. It is evident that
all the holders of these interests cannot be in possession of the
land at the same time and that some must wait for the termina-
tion of the prior estates before they can come into the enjoy-
ment of their own estates. These persons who must wait for
the prior estates to come to an end before gaining possession for
themselves, are said to have future interests in the land. These
future interests are of two kinds, reversions and remainders. If
the owner of land conveys away an estate less than what he has,
it is clear that there is a residue of his original estate left in
him and this interest is called a reversion. It is always a vested
interest and is said to be created by operation of law and not by
act of the parties themselves. It is vested because the only
thing standing in the way of the owner's immediate enjoyment
is the existence of the particular or prior estate he granted
away. If at the time he grants the lesser estate, he gives, in the
same instrument, a second or even a third estate to other per-
sons, these succeeding estates are called remainders. For in-
stance, if A, the owner of Blackacre, grants a life estate to B
and then an estate for the life of C with remainder in fee to D
and his heirs, these interests created in C and D are future
interests known as remainders. The term "remainder" comes
from the Latin verb "remanere" and was originally used to
show that the interest created remainder away from the grantor.
It does not come back to him on the termination of the prior
estate in A; whereas in the case of the reversion, the land does
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
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revert or come back to the grantor on the lapse of the life estate
iA.
Remainders are said to be either vested or contingent. A
vested remainder is a present interest in the land with the
enjoyment thereof postponed until the termination of the prior
life estate or estates; while a contingent remainder is merely
a possibility of acquiring an interest in the land on the happen-
ing of some contingency in the future. This possibility, as
Tiffany says, "exists when what would otherwise be a vested
remainder is subject to a condition precedent, or is created in
favor of an uncertain person or persons." 1  The late Professor
Gray, who was probably the best known and most widely quoted
authority in this country on questions involving future interests
-a large portion of which subject deals with remainders-
defines vested and contingent remainders as follows:
"Remainders are either vested or contingent. A remainder is
vested if, at every moment during its continuance, it becomes a
present estate, whenever and however the preceding freehold estates
determine. A remainder is contingent if, in order for it to become a
present estate, the fulfilment of some condition precedent, other than
the determination of the preceding freehold estates, is necessary."
He then gives this example to illustrate: "If an estate is
given to A for life, remainder to his eldest born son in fee, the
remainder is contingent until the birth of A's first born and
then vests." 2 Still later in his work we find him saying:
"A vested remainder is defined as a future estate which takes
effect as a present estate immediately upon the expiration of the
preceding estate or estates as originally limited, and is ready at every
moment during its continuance to come into possession whenever and
however the preceding estates determine. That is to say, a vested
remainder is a future estate that is subject to no condition precedent
except the termination of the preceding estate."'
Fearne, who wrote his treatise on Contingent Remainders
in 1772 and who is still frequently cited both in court decisions
and text books, begins his essay with this definition of a con-
tingent remainder:
"A CONTINGENT REMAINDER is a remainder limited so as to
depend on an event or condition which may never happen or be per-
formed, or which may not happen or be performed till after the
determination of the preceding estate;-for if the preceding estate(unless it be a mere trust estate) determine before such event or
condition happens, the remainder will never take effect; as will
12 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd. ed., 1939) 22.
Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities (3rd. ed., 1915) sec. 9.
'Ibid, sec. 270.
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appear, when I come to treat of the time when a contingent remainder
is to vest."'
It has been pointed out by Tiffany that this definition by
Fearne is not accurate unless there be excluded from the pos-
sible causes of vacancy of the possession, the normal expiration
of the preceding estate. For instance, in a devise to A for life
with a remainder to B and his heirs, provided B survives A, the
remainder is contingent, although capable, upon a vacancy in
possession arising from A's death, of taking effect in possession. 5
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has stated the same things in
these words: ". . . where the event which renders the posses-
sion vacant also resolves the contingency upon which the limita-
tion depends, and makes that certain which was before uncer-
tain" the remainder is contingent.0 This statement was cited
by the court in a later opinion.7 The executors in that case
were to pay the rents and profits to the testator's son for his
life and to pay over the proceeds after the son's death to his
descendants, if there be any living, if none, the property was
to be conveyed to his heirs. The court held that the descendants
of the life tenant took a contingent remainder since it was
impossible to ascertain what persons would come within the
description until the death of the life tenant. The death of the
life tenant here rendered the possession vacant, and also resolved
the contingency upon which the limitation depended.
A great deal of confusion is apparent in decisions deter-
mining the nature of a remainder in the simple case of a gift
of Blackacre to A for life with remainder in fee in A's heirs.
Before the enactment of statutes abolishing the rule in Shelley's
case, such a case presented a simple solution for the rule in
Shelley's case provided that the ancestor, A, should take a fee
simple if the gifts were created by the same instrument and
were of the same quality, that is both legal or both equitable
estates.8 The Rule has been abrogated in Kentucky9 and a large
number of American jurisdictions.10 Apart from the Rule in
Shelley's case, it is clear that at common law a devise or grant
4Fearne, Contingent Remainders (6th. ed., 1819) 3.
'2 Tiffany, op. cit., supra n. 1 at 35.
Williamson v. Williamson, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 329, 368 (1857).
SJohnson v. Jacob, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 646, 658 (1876).
1 Co. 93a (1581).
'Ky. Stat. (Carroll, 1936), sec. 2345.
10 Simes, Future Interests (1936) sec. 135.
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to A for life with remainder to his heirs in fee, created a con-
tingent remainder in A's heirs since a living person could not
have heirs. Who- would take the remainder upon the termina-
tion of the life estate in A was not determinable until A's
death." In Williamson v. Williamson,'2 the testator left land
to his daughters to have, hold, and enjoy the rents and profits
therefrom during their natural lives and at their deaths the title
of the land was to vest in their heirs in fee. The court, in the
course of its opinion, said:
"The word 'heir,' in its strict technical sense, denotes the person
on whom, at the ancestor's decease, the law casts the inheritance.
During the life of the ancestor the heir must therefore be considered
as a person either not in being or not ascertained, inasmuch as it
is uncertain who will fill that character at the time of the ancestor's
death. It would seem, then, to follow that a limitation to the heirs
of a person in existence, if it have the other qualities of a remainder,
must be a contingent remainder. And such a limitation comes pre-
cisely within Mr. Fearne's fourth class of contingent remainders .... "
Quoting further from this same opinion, written by Mr. Justice
Simpson, we come to an often cited statement of our appellate
court as to when a remainder is vested:
"Now the peculiar terms in which the remainder in question and
many of the others are created, show clearly that the testator intended
so to limit the remainders given after the life estate to his daughters,
that they should not vest until their deaths respectively. The lan-
guage he uses is clear and explicit: 'And at their deaths the title 'to
the same is to vest in their heirs in fee forever:' that is at the death
of his daughters the title to the same property which he devised to
them, was to vest in their heirs. There is here clearly a certain
time fixed, when the title to the property shall vest in those entitled
in remainder. The vesting referred to can not be confined to the
possession, because it is expressly stated that the title to the property
shall then vest. If, therefore, the title is to vest in their heirs at the
death of the mother, it can not have vested previous to that time; for,
as said in the case above referred to of Glanvill v. Glanvill (2 Meriv.
38), there can not be two periods of vesting, and by fixing one the
testator must be taken to have excluded the other."
In Johnson v. Jacob,'4 the use of property was given to
testatrix's husband for his life and after his death it was to "be
conveyed and paid to his descendants, if there be any such then
living. If there be no such descendants, then the same
shall be paid and conveyed to his heirs." The court in finding
the remainder to be contingent, said:
112 Tiffany, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 101.
2Supra note 6
1P. 376.
' Supra note 7
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"It being impossible to ascertain what persons would fall within
the description until the death of the life tenant, this would seem to
be a case in which the remainder was undoubtedly limited to persons
not ascertained, and some of whom were not in esse when the limita-
tion was made."
Jones v. Thomasson15 dealt with a devise to children for
their natural lives "and after their death to their children."
The court said in that case:
"The rule is well settled that where the devise over is to the
children of the life tenant, although they may not be named, or to the
children, naming them, they take a vested estate in remainder; but if
the devise over is to the 'heirs' of the life tenant unless the word
'heirs' means children, the heirs take only a contingent remainder
subject to be defeated by their death before the death of the life
tenant."
The court quoted this statement with approval in Bentley v.
Consolidated Coal Company,l6 adding:
"This rule is based upon the reason that the word 'heirs' is
necessarily a word of purchase because it cannot be ascertained who
the heirs of any individual are until his death; while 'children' is a
word of limitation and refers to a class of individuals who may be
readily ascertained during the life of the first taker, and may take an
interest which vests during the life tenant's holding even though its
enjoyment is postponed, and which therefore may descend or be sold
during the existence of the life estate."
The devise in this case was to a daughter with the provision
that the land should "after her decease descend to the heirs of
her body forever." The context of the will showed that "heirs
of the body" was not used in the technical sense but to mean
"children." Whether the estate in the children was a defeasi-
ble one or not was not considered by the court. Ordinarily a
devise to one for life, with remainder to the children of the life
tenant living at the death of the life tenant or' a gift to them
after the death of the life tenant, has been said to create a vested
remainder in the children subject to be divested if they prede-
cease the life tenant, that is, a defeasible fee.17
In Mercantile Bank of New York v. Ballard's Assignee,'8
the devise was to one for life with remainder to the children of
the life tenant with the proviso that if the life tenant should die
childless the property should go to other relatives. It was held
that a vested remainder was created in the children subject to
159 Ky. 196, 166 S. W. 1001 (1914).
209 Ky. 63, 272 S. W. 48 (1925).
"Tiffany, Real Prop. (Abridged ed., 1940) 211.
1883 Ky. 481, 4 Am. St. Rep. 160 (1885).
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be divested upon death in the lifetime of the life tenant. The
purchaser from the children during the life tenant's lifetime
took subject to divestment if his transferor did not survive the
life tenant. In this case, too, the court added that the remainder
would be contingent if it had been made to the "heirs" of the
life tenant. The same result was reached in the more recent
case of Johnson v. Whitcomb,19 where a testator devised his
estate to his widow for life with remainder to his brother and
sisters or such of them as might be living at the death of the life
tenant. The court said that the devisees took a fee simple estate
in remainder, subject to be defeated by their death before that
of the life tenant.
In result, it would seem that it makes little difference
whether such an interest is called a defeasible fee or a con-
tingent remainder. Courts, in their zeal to give effect to the old
and well established rule that preference is to be given to vested
remainders rather than to contingent remainders in construing
an instrument, will hold a remainder vested if they possibly can.
In doing so they sometimes go too far and do violence to the
language of the instrument creating the remainder. The rule
never was intended to be carried that far. When it is, it ceases
to be a rule of construction. Where one is given a remainder
provided he survive the life tenant and we hold it a defeasible
fee, he can convey his interest and mortgage it, but if he does
not fulfill the condition by surviving the life tenant, the trans-
feree gets nothing by his deed or mortgage. It is the same under
a contingent remainder today since a contingent remainderman
can convey or mortgage his interest during the lifetime of the
life tenant just as the holder of a defeasible fee can. If he sur-
vives the life tenant, his transferee takes what the contingent
remainderman would get; if he does not survive, his transferee
gets nothing.20 In Hurst v. Russell,21 the court was called upon
to consider a devise to the'testator's daughter "to have and to
hold the said premises above mentioned and described during
her natural life, then to her lawful heirs and assigns forever."
The daughter's children were held to have a contingent re-
mainder which they could mortgage.
1' 166 Ky. 673, 179 S. W. 821 (1915).
=Taylorville v. Vandyke, 159 Ky. 201, 166 S. W. 1024 (1914);
Hurst v. Russell, 257 Ky. 78, 77 S. W. (2d) 355 (1934).
1 Supra note 20.
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The cases we have thus far considered support the common
law definitions of vested and contingent remainders as they are
formulated in the passages cited from Fearne and Gray. Let
us net consider changes brought about by statutes.
(2) Statutory Definitions.
Considerable confusion has been brought into the problem
of determining whether a remainder is vested or contingent by
the attempt in New York and a few other states that follow the
lead of that state, to embody in statutory form definitions of
both vested and contingent remainders. The New York statute
provides:
"A future estate is either vested or contingent. It is vested,
when there is a person in being, who would have an immediate right
to the possession of the property on the determination of all the inter-
mediate or precedent estates. It is contingent while the person to
whom or the event on which it is limited to take effect remains
uncertain.""
Under these definitions, a gift "to A for life with remainder
to the heirs of A" and A has children living, there would be a
vested remainder in the children of A. Of course this is on
the assumption that the rule in Shelley's case is not in force, for
if it has not been abrogated, this gift would create a fee simple
in A under that rule. Clearly under the common law definitions
of contingent and vested remainders, a grant to A for life and
then to the heirs of A in remainder would give a contingent
remainder to the heirs of A since a living person can have no
heirs.23 Yet, under the New York statutory definition, the heirs
apparent of A, since he has children, are ascertainable. One can
point to A's children at any time and say, "These are the per-
sons who would have the remainder estate if A were to die this
instant." The conditions under the statute are fulfilled, the
remainder is vested. Several other states have statutes similar
to or based on that of New York.24
Consolidated Laws of New York (Cahill, 1930) ch. 51, sec. 40.
" Williamson v. Williamson, supra note 6.
"Arizona Rev. Code (1928), sec. 2760; California Civil Code
(Deering, 1937), sec. 693, 695; Idaho Code (1932), sees. 54-105,
54-106; Michigan Comp. Laws (1929), sec. 12933; Minnesota Stat.(Mason's 1927), sec. 8043; Montana Rev. Codes (Anderson & McF.,
1935), sees. 6689-6691; North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913), sees. 5271-
5273; South Dakota Comp. Laws (1929), secs. 278-280; and Wisconsin
Statutes (1939), sec. 230.13.
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The difficulty arises when a court in a jurisdiction not
having such a statute, overlooking the fact that some states
have these statutory definitions df vested and contingent re-
mainders, undertake to rely upon decisions that have been
based upon these statutes. For instance, the Alabama court,
believing the statement of Chancellor Kent that this definition
"appears to be accurately and fully expressed," purported to
adopt it as the common law definition of vested and contingent
remainders, only to repudiate it in a later decision and to have
the legislature formally repeal it.25 In its opinion in Smaw v.
Young,26 the Alabama court acknowledged that it had been
misled by Chancellor Kent and that its decision in the earlier
case of Kumpe v. Coons27 could not be sustained on principle.
The statute passed following these decisions restored the com-
mon law denition of contingent remainders in that state. Pro-
fessor Kales, in speaking of the situation in Alabama, said:
"The Alabama court, having been misled into thinking that the
New York statutory distinction was the common law distinction, has
frankly acknowledged its mistake and emphasized the fact that the
New York cases are justifiable only under the New York statutorydefinition.,"2
The Illinois court committed the same error but rectified its
mistake in a later decision.2 9 In a recent case, the Illinois court
was called upon to consider a gift to the testator's daughters
which was qualified by the words "if they be living at the death
or marriage of my said wife." In reaching their decision, they
thoroughly examined cases involving survivorship.
"The question of remainders," the court observed, "conditioned
upon supervisorship is discussed by Gray in 'The Rule against Per-
petuities.' The author suggests there are reasons why remainders
should always be held contingent, and, on the other hand, that there
are reasons why they should always be held vested. After discussing
the New York statutory definition of vested and contingent remaind-
ers, together with the comment of Chancellor Kent thereon, and
pointing out the confusion that has resulted therefrom in a number of
states, the author says, 'Neither of these views is that of the common
law. Whether a remainder is vested or contingent depends upon
the language employed. If the conditional element is incorporated
into the description of or into the gift to the remainderman then the
"Alabama Code (1907). see. 3401.
109 Ala. 528, 20 So. 370 (1896).
' 63 Ala. 448 (1879).
Kales, Estates Future Interests (2nd ed., 1920) 389.
2'Boatman v. Boatman, 198 Ill. 414, 65 N. E. 81 (1902); Golladay
v. Knock, 235 Ill. 412, 85 N. E. 649 (1908).
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remainder is contingent, but if, after words giving a vested interest,
a clause is added divesting it the remainder is vested.' "0
We have seen that under the New York statutory definition
a devise to A for life with remainder to the heirs of A, gives
the heirs of A a vested remainder provided A has children
living, since there are persons to whom you can point and say,
"These are the persons who would take the estate if A were to
die this instant." We have seen further that under the early
common law, A would have a fee simple in this case as the Rule
in Shelley's case would apply.
The New York statutory definition of vested and contingent
remainders is of interest to us in the state of Kentucky because
the Court of Appeals has quoted it with approval in some of its
opinions. In the early case of Forsythe v. Lansing's Exrs.,31 it
is referred to as it appears in the New York statute. The in-
terest created in that case, however, was held to be a defeasible
fee. In other cases the court has quoted this same definition
from the work of Chancellor Kent as though it were the common
law definition of vested and contingent remainders. For ex-
ample, in Sherley v. Sherley,32 the realty was left to the testa-
tor's wife for life and at her death it was to be sold and the
proceeds divided between testator's three sons, who were named.
It was held that the interest of the sons was vested. The court
said:
"A remainder interest in property is vested when there is a per-
son in being who would have an immediate right to its enjoyment in
possession, if the precedent estate should determine."
The facts of the case, however, justified the decision that the
remainder interest was vested. The gifts were to named per-
sons and the postponement was not for the purpose of ascer-
taining competent devisees but rather for the benefit of the
estate.
In Erdman v. Masters,3 Mr. Justice Sampson quoted the
same definition from Chancellor Kent and apparently assumed
that it was the common law definition of contingent remainders.
The conclusion of the court in that case, however, was that the
interest created was a defeasible fee. The income of property
" Ryan v. Beshk, 329 I1. 45, 170 N. E. 699 (1930).
31109 Ky. 518, 59 S. W. 854 (1900).
192 Ky. 122, 232 S. W. 53 (1921).
"208 Ky. 361, 270 S. W. 758 (1925).
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was given to a life tenant and then the principal was to be
divided among the testator's children, or if there be none, then
among named persons. The children were held to have a
defeasible fee. To follow the language of the court:
"A vested estate in remainder exists where there is a person in
being who would have an immediate right to its enjoyment in posses-
sion if the life estate upon which it depends should determine."
To be contrasted with this passage is the wording of the New
York statute, which reads:
"It is vested, when there is a person in being, who would have
an immediate right to the possession of the property, on the determi-
nation of all the intermediate or precedent estate.""
We should then recall to mind the definition given by Professor
Gray where he says:
"A remainder is vested if, at every moment during its contin-
uance, it becomes a present estate, whenever and however the prec-
edent freehold estate determine. A remainder is contingent if, in
order for it to become a present estate, the fulfilment of some condi-
tion precedent, other than the determination of the preceding free-
hold estates, is necessary."'
Dean Fraser of the University of Minnesota Law School in
dealing with the problem under consideration, has observed:
"The statutory definition of vested remainders is unfortunate.
It has caused confusion and uncertainty in the law of New York.
The definition of contingent remainders contradicts it. A remainder
is said to be contingent while the person to whom it is limited remains
uncertain. The two contradictory definitions led Chief Justice Sav-
age to say that some remainders are by the definitions, both vested
and contingent at the same time."'
SUM] WARY
A devise or a grant of a remainder to the heirs of a living
person comes within the common law definition of a contingent
remainder. In the case of a will, there is often language in the
devise which further emphasizes that fact, as where the testator,
for instance, uses the words "after his death," referring to the
death of the life tenant. It has always been the rule of the
common law that a living person cannot have heirs. His heirs
cannot be determined until his death. Persons who are now
living and who in all likelihood will become his heirs, may in
fact predecease the life tenant.
"Supra note 22.
Supra note 2.
"4 Minnesota Law Rev. 307, 327, citing Carter v. Lorillard, 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 265 (1835).
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Some courts, laying an over-emphasis upon the rule that
courts prefer a vested remainder to a contingent one, find
devises vested wherever they can and in doing so have in too
many cases done violence to the language of testators and
grantors, and have held remainders vested which in fact were
clearly contingent. Courts have found that defeasible fees were
created where the same result might have been reached in a
more logical way by calling the interests contingent remainders;
since in either situation if the holders of such interests convey,
as they may today in nearly all jurisdictions, their grantees
take nothing if the original holders do not survive the life
tenants.
A great deal of uncertainty has been caused in determining
whether a remainder is vested or contingent by statutory defini-
tions adopted at an early date in the state of New Work and
cited with approval by Chancellor Kent under the mistaken
belief that they were correct statements of the common law
definitions of vested and contingent remainders. We have seen
that similar statutes have been adopted in nine other states and
many courts in jurisdictions where there are no such statutes
have been misled by them. This was true in the, states of
Alabama and Illinois, in which jurisdictions today, the courts
have gone back to the common law definitions; in Alabama by
the enactment of a statute and in Illinois by the court's over-
ruling its decisions which applied the New York test. Dean
Fraser of Minnesota has pointed out that the adoption of these
statutory definitions is unfortunate and has added confusion
and uncertainty into our law today.
